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Abstract 
Information is essential to the continued growth of any society. A secure information infrastructure is required. 
Despite creditable efforts, there are visible failures of Information Security (IS). Breach data, by its nature, offers 
factual data about what is happening that should reveal what more is required for improved countermeasures. This 
work, therefore, provides statistical insight into breach data through analysis of the data set of disclosed breaches for 
the period January 1st, 2011 to May 18th 2011 kept by a leading and open repository. The analysis informed that 
mitigation efforts should include improved perimeter security, document archiving and disposal procedure, and 
physical security for foreseeable future. 
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1. Introduction 
Information is essential to the continued growth of any society. Information is created, managed, processed, and 
archived by an information system. The confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability issues of 
information must be ensured for appropriate usage (Somasundaram and Shrivastava, 2009; Stamp, 2006). A secure 
information infrastructure is required. Information Security (IS) is ensuring that the information systems perform 
according to stipulation and retain optimum performance in the face of clever wrongdoers or oppositions. 
Information is vulnerable to technical, physical and human threats, and risks to IS must be continually assessed and 
effectively addressed (Richo Security Solutions, 2010). Threats to information security include errors and omissions, 
fraud and theft, malicious hackers, malicious code, denial-of-service attacks, and social engineering (Shostack and 
Stewart, 2009). There exist security measures to combat IS modelled threats, but how effective and efficient are they 
in reality, and what more is needed? 
It is known that enterprise-wide security programs, establishing security policies (Peltier, Peltier, and Blackley, 2005), 
and designing and configuring information systems for reliable and successful operation from the start (Martin and 
Weadock, 1997), are security measures believed to combat threats to IS. Against these: Neutralisation theory 
provides a compelling explanation for information system security policy violations and offers new insight into how 
employees rationalize their behaviour (Siponen and Vance, 2010); employee’s intention to comply with information 
security policy is significantly influenced by attitude, normative beliefs, and self efficacy to comply (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010); and designing and configuring information systems for reliable and successful 
operation from the start introduces complexities that increase the risk of bugs. Use of encryption provides storage 
confidentiality but introduces system performance issues and denial-of-service vulnerabilities. There are a number of 
fundamental issues militating against successful IS measures. 
Despite credible efforts, some generally visible failures of IS are spam and associated problems (Helbush, 2009), 
malicious codes (Eichin and Rochlis, 1989), bugs in software including operating systems (Keizer, 2010), and data 
breaches (Aitoro, 2007). Notable failings of IS (FBI, 2010; Helbush, 2009; SonicWALL, 2008; Klienman, 2007; FBI, 
2007; Gartner, 2007), IS industry not currently organized for IS leadership (Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, 2010; Johnson 
and Warkentin, 2010; Baskerville and Myers, 2009), and inadequacies of existing evidence to support IS decision 
making (Shostack and Stewart, 2009; Hoffer and Straub, 1989) are cogent reasons for fresh perspective to the subject 
of IS. 
Evidence-based practice implies the use of field or empirical research findings as evidence supporting effective 
development and use of information systems, thereby linking theory to practice (Oates, 2009), but doing any survey 
in IS in a scientifically defensible manner (designing a set of questions that do not betray bias and finding a suitable 
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set of respondents) is very challenging, and there is the impediment of imprecise vocabulary (Shostack and Stewart, 
2009; Ryan and Jefferson, 2003). Further militating against collection of factual data is what psychologists call the 
“valance effect”, which is people’s tendency to overestimate the likelihood of good things happening rather than bad 
things (Rosenhan and Messick, 1966).  
The use of breach data and other new sources of data that would eliminate or reduce some of the setbacks of survey 
in IS, and would provide new perspective to the subject of IS were proposed (Mahmood, et al., 2010; Shostack and 
Stewart, 2009). Breach data is generated as a result of reports of data breaches. Data breaches may involve personal 
health information (PHI), personally identifiable information (PII), trade secrets or intellectual property. The catalyst 
for reporting data breaches to the affected individuals has been the US California law that requires notice of security 
breaches implemented July 2003 ([Online] Available: http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489, 8/4/12). More 
than forty of US states have since passed laws requiring that individuals be notified of security breaches (Attrition, 
2011; PrivacyRights, 2011). The breach data by its nature offers widely spread, unbiased, and easily accessible data 
for analysis to provide fresh insight into issues surrounding data breaches and therefore IS. Breach data is gathered 
and shared at PogoWasRight.org, Attrition.org, Privacy Rights Clearing House, and other sites (Shostack and Stewart, 
2009, p187). 
A number of works have been done analyzing breach data (Gordon, et al, 2010; Culnan and Williams, 2009; Hasan 
and Yurcik, 2006; Acquisti, Friedman and Telang, 2006; Tehan, 2005), but none yet examined the current collection 
of breach data towards improved countermeasures. 
The goal of this work was, therefore, to gain insight into breach data toward improved countermeasures against 
storage security breaches through statistical analysis of certain current breaches data set. This should provide 
enlightening information regarding security incidents that would inform improved security measures. 
 
1.1. Method of the Research 
The data requirement for this work includes details of who did the breach, methods used, what assets were involved, 
what were the asset attributes affected, and so on, sufficient for meaning report. The data generation method was 
found documents; publicized reports of breach incidents between January 1st, 2011 and May 18th 2011, which avoids 
the biases indicated against designing questionnaires and finding appropriate respondents (Ryan and Jefferson, 2003) 
were sought. Sampling frame of all storage security breaches between January 1st, 2011 and May 18th 2011, from 
which a sample is to be chosen was not possible because there is no way of knowing all storage security breaches 
during the period of interest; not all the breaches involved PII, not all that involved PII are reported, not all that 
involved PII that are reported may have been captured, and not all the breaches have been discovered. Sampling 
technique; this piece of work took the data set of a leading repository of storage security breaches data, Open 
Security Foundation, Datalossdb.org (Adebayo, 2012), of reported breach incidents for the period between January 
1st, 2011 and May 18th 2011 as a cluster representing the population of interest, in order to save the cost and time of 
searching for the individual breach incident and its details. Datalossdb.org offers certain links to original publications, 
a random selection of which was verified. The details datalossdb.org provides for each breach include: date of 
incidence, country of incidence, organization name, type of organization, type of breach, number of records lost, and 
whether insider or outsider breach. Number of breaches during this period, in datalossdb.org data set, was two 
hundred and ten, but one incidence involving the loss of seventy-seven million records was ignored as an outlier. 
This data set though could not be said to be statistically representative of total breaches that occurred during the 
period, offers useful insight into storage security breaches for improved countermeasures. The data obtained was 
analyzed, using SPSS 15.0 for Windows, along the following dimensions: number of records per incidence summary 
statistics, reported and percentage of reported storage breach incidents and storage records lost by organization type, 
number of breaches and records lost by breach mechanism, number of breaches and records lost by insider or 
outsider, number of breaches and records lost in time, number of records lost per incidence by organization type, 
number of records lost per incidence by breach mechanism, number of law suits on storage security breaches, and 
fraction of perpetrators arrested or  prosecuted, in order to communicate what could be learnt about storage breach 
events toward improved countermeasures. 
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2. Outcomes 
The succeeding sections are 2.1 - Data Presentation, 2.2 – Discussion, and 2.3 – Other Related Works. 
 
2.1 Data Presentation 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of number of records per breach incident. Figure 1 depicts number of breaches 
according to type of organization. Figure 2 depicts reported storage records lost by organization type. Table 2 and 
Figure 3 present number of breaches by detailed breach mechanism. Figure 4 presents number of records lost by 
breach mechanism. Figure 5 depicts number of breaches by insider or outsider. Figure 6 shows the number of records 
lost by insider or outsider. Figures 7 and 8 show scatter diagrams of the number of breaches and number of records 
lost in time, respectively. Figure 9 depicts fraction of law suits on storage security breaches. Figure 10 depicts 
fraction of perpetrators arrested or prosecuted. 
 
2.2 Discussion 
The mean number of records per breach incident is 170,563 and the highest record loss was 24,600,000 (Table 1).  
Incidences with no record lost were included for other knowledge that may be gained. 
Businesses (Biz) suffer more breaches, followed by medical (Med), education (Edu), and government (Gov) 
institutions, respectively (Figure 1). Malefactors do breaches for nefarious gains about which businesses and medical 
institutions seem greener. It was revealed that businesses lost more records than all other types of organizations put 
together (Figure 2). Number of records lost is one of the main indicators of breach incident severity. 
Hacking topped as a breach mechanism (Table 2 and Figure 3) though the sum of physical losses is worse. Hacking 
topped by far as a breach mechanism in terms of number of records lost. The 24,600,000 records were lost through 
hacking (Table 1 and Figure 4). This calls for improved perimeter security, and Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Systems. More attention should also be given document archiving and disposal, and physical security. 
Outsiders perpetrated more breaches than insider malicious (Figure 5). Outsider breaches result in the largest number 
of lost records (Figure 6). More care should definitely be paid securing network perimeter, and attention should be 
given stemming insider accidental losses that ranked second, probably through training and policies.  
There is no time target for breaches (Figure 7). The number of records loss in time is low (<4,500) (Figure 8). 
Malefactors seem to avoid the usually successful hunt that comes with hitting big volume records probably because 
of the policing heat that they generate. 
The number of law suits on storage security breaches (<2%) is minimal (Figure 9). Organizations need not fear 
reporting storage security breaches.  
The fraction of perpetrators arrested or prosecuted stood at 18.6 percent (Figure 10). This will likely discourage 
malefactors. 
It is also appropriate to mention the need for improved framework for breach data capture. More specificity in 
capturing the details about the breach incidents should produce more revelations towards improved IS decisions. 
 
2.3 Other Related Works  
A summary of selected storage security incidents reported in the press between 2000 and 2005 was conducted (Tehan, 
2005). In this a small data set of incidents was used and biased sampling was noted. 
A report of the United States’ (US’s) state of California Department of Consumer affairs/Office of Privacy Protection 
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in April, 2006, claims that physical attack is the most prevalent form of storage breach in California. It is observed 
from this data that physical is still the breach mechanism that is most prevalent, though hacking is more severe.  
A study on the impart of security breaches on stock market valuations claims that publicly reporting security 
breaches does not negatively affect, in the mid-term, the valuation of stock of the reporting organization (Acquisti, et 
al; 2006). It is noted, though, that the study presented a skewed and partial view because it was limited to incidents 
affecting only publicly traded firms, and it includes different types of security breaches not limited to storage 
breaches. It was however shown that voluntary disclosure of information security breaches is associated positively 
with the market value of a firm (Gordon, et al, 2010). This piece of work shows law suits on storage security 
breaches is negligible, and therefore offers no contradiction. 
A study that claimed to be the first valid statistical analysis of disclosed storage security breaches used combined 
data set spanning January 1, 2005 to June 5, 2006, from two leading sources. It shows that 35% of breaches occur in 
educational institutions, followed by Business with 25%; 36% of total number of records lost was from Business 
against 3% Educational institutions; 41% of breaches occur via external intrusion or hacking with 36% through 
physical attack (Hasan and Yurcik, 2006). The current analysis shows businesses taking the lead in terms of number 
of storage security breach incidents and number of records lost, but shows external intrusion as still the leading 
breach mechanism in severity. 
2011 Data Breach Investigation Report by Verizon Risk Team, US secret service and Dutch High Tech Crime Unit 
(April, 2010) shows that 92% of data breaches stemmed from external agents, 50% of breaches are through some 
form of hacking, 83% of victims were targets of opportunity, and 96% of breaches were avoidable through simple or 
intermediate controls (Verizon, 2011). It is noted that the data set used include only Verizon confirmed incidents of 
data compromise involving deliberate breach and compromise situations, and the data set is not also open to external 
scrutiny. Besides, it is unlikely that Verizon will be called to investigate the loss of portable devices. The current 
analysis shows a 50:50 chance of data breaches stemming from external or internal agents, and shows that about 46% 
of breaches are still through some form of hacking. 
The use of proactive system engineering in designing protection for storage systems, based on classical security 
principles or data lifecycle model, by organising system threats and vulnerabilities into general classes to be 
addressed with known storage protection techniques (Hasan, et al, 2005) would be enlightened by breach data 
analysis. 
 
3. Conclusion 
This work presents further empirical evidence towards assessing risk of storage security breaches. It informs and it is 
clearer, for foreseeable future, that mitigation efforts should include improved perimeter security, document 
archiving and disposal procedure, and physical security. 
It also compels, being enlightening itself, that periodic work of this type should be done on improved data set to 
inform improved IS decision making over time. The applications of threat modelling should also be complimented 
with what breach data analysis informs. 
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Figure 2 - Reported storage records lost by organization type 
 
      
 
Figure 3 – Number of breaches by Breach Mechanism 
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Figure 4 – Number of Records Lost by Breach Mechanism 
 
 
Figure 5 – Number of breach incidents by Insider or Outsider 
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Figure 6 – Number of Records Lost by Insider or Outsider 
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Figure 7 – Number of Breaches in Time 
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Dot/Lines show Sums
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Figure 8 – Number of Records Lost in Time 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 9 – Fraction of Law Suits 
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Figure 10 – Fraction of Perpetrators Arrested/Prosecuted 
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Table 2 – Number of breaches by Breach Mechanism 
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